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Sea or lake : A major issue for Russia
Vicken CHETERIAN
1 The Russian Federation inherited only a small segment of the Caspian Sea - or rather lake.
Russia has equally lost the economic supremacy over the Caspian, where the development
of the off-shore oil extraction needs both Western capital and technology. The paradox
Moscow faces is  how to keep its  political  domination,  while at  the same time solicit
economic collaboration with American, British or Japenese oil companies. To what extent
can it collaborate with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the energy sector, two former Soviet
states which compete with Moscow over the partition of the Caspian, without losing its
influence over them? And, how will the oil projects interact with the political/military
partition  of  the  region,  and  influence  the  outcome of  the  existing  conflicts?  These
struggles will determine not only the future political and economic system around the
Caspian, but also much of the ruling patterns in Moscow, Baku, Almaty and other capitals
of the region.
2  This body of water - that separates the sandy deserts of Central Asia in the east from the
Caucasian chain to its west, the dry steppes in the north from the Elburs mountains in
Persia  -  has  long  attracted  the  attention  of  the  Russians.  Astrakhan1 Khanate  was
destroyed by Ivan IV (the Terrible) in 1554, opening the way for further expansion east
and south. Makhachkala was occupied in 1784 (then called Port Petrov), and Baku in 1806.
The Russian expansion in Turkestan, to the east of the Caspian, was accomplished in the
second half of that century. During the Second World War, the Red Army occupied the
northern part of Iran, which Stalin tried to sovietize after the war in 1945-46. Had he been
successful, this would have turned the Caspian into a Soviet lake. 
3  Compared with past decades, Moscow is clearly on the defensive to save what can be
saved of the total  monopoly it  had over most of the Caspian,  the Transcaucasus and
Central Asia. From this perspective, Moscow is on the defensive and does not have an
aggressive expansionist approach. It considers that its ill-defined “national interests” are
being challenged here too by western powers,  old regional  rivals  like Turkey,  which
collide with the over two centuries old rebellion of the Chechens. Moscow finds that its
policy  of  creating  zones  of  influence,  which  is  legally  called  the  Commonwealth  of
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Independent States (CIS) and less officially the “near abroad”, is similar to the American
backdoor garden in Latin America, while its brutal military intervention in Chechnya was
simply justifiable and comprehensible similar to the US military intervention in Panama,
Kuwait-Iraq, or more recently in Haiti. 
4  If  Moscow politicians still  have the feeling that their great power status and several
centuries domination over the Caspian gives them special rights there, this impression is
not shared by others. Both the methods of domination and the historic memory of the
other peoples reinforce the rejection of the Russian “natural” right to rule. Around late
1992-early 1993, both political and military elites in Moscow decided to firmly keep their
positions  in  the  Caucasus  and Central  Asia,  after  abandoning strategically  important
regions in easter-central Europe and the Baltics. While Moscow had no model for its rule -
having abandoned its unpopular Soviet system yet itself unclear how to reproduce its
power  base  -,  and  unable  to  address  the  basic  needs  for  the  socio-economic
reconstruction   of  the  new republics,  it  still  had  the  means  to  keep  its  domination:
through  its  military  supremacy  in  the  region.  This  model  of  military  domination  is
outdated, unable to legitimate itself. Compare NATO’s expansion to the east, not to say
the continuous presence of US troops in Europe after the end of the original reason for
their presence (that is the threat of the Red Army), with the Russian military intervention
in Grozny: the first is seen by the public opinion of these countries as a protection and
extension of the security umbrella to eastern-central Europe, while the two-year military
campaign in Chechnya is seen as unjust even by Russian public opinion. Moreover, the
operation failed in its objectives, and today the Chechen forces are back in Grozny while
the Russian troops are withdrawing, as twice before in 1991 and 1992. 
5  The  major  problem of  the  re-creation of  the  Russian domination over  its  southern
neighbours is the chaos and uncertainty reigning in the Kremlin2. The constant changes
in the upper echelons has introduced radical shifts in policy orientation. The competition
between  the  various  state  institutions,  where  roles  remain  unclear  and  numerous
interventions in foreign policy-making occur, is another problem. The third problem is
the uncertainty and continuous decline of the Russian economy. 
6  Therefore, Russian policy today and in the near future towards the Caspian is surrounded
with uncertainty. While we continue to witness the struggle for the formation of the new
division around the Caspian, one should expect surprises again and again. Therefore, I
will try to draw a number of parameters over this rapidly developing picture that will be
relevant to Russia’s Caspian policy:
7 1- The energy sector and the formation of the new ruling elite;
8 2- The energy question and the “near abroad”;
9 3- Moscow’s relations with Iran, Turkey, the Arabs and the West in the Caspian area;
10 4- The autonomous republics of the Russian Federation and the Caspian. 
11  Symbols  save much ink:  Viktor  Chernomyrdin,  the  previous  director  of  Gazprom is
today's Russian prime minister3.  He was the logical  successor of  Igor Gaydar and his
market-oriented reforms. The energy industry, liberated from the state-fixed prices at a
fraction of that of the world market, has survived the shock-therapy to become the most
profitable  sector  in  the  Russian  economy.  Through  this,  the  energy  wing  of  the
nomenklatura acquired  dominance,  while  the  party,  military  and  industrial  lobbies
disintegrated.  After  the  Russian  presidential  elections  last  year,  when  the  elected
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president  Boris  Yeltsin  has  constantly  been  absent  because  of  his  poor  health,
Chernomyrdin has taken over the functions of the presidency4. 
12  Five  years  after  the  disintegration  of  the  USSR,  the  basic  question  the  reforms  of
Gorbachev tried to  address  is  still  valid:  how to  modernize  the  Soviet  economy and
integrate it in the world system. At the heart of the Soviet economy stood the military
industry, which enjoyed all kinds of privileges, received the most important investments
in material and workforce. All other industries depended on the military, forming the
famous military-industrial complex. The Soviets believed that a strong military and heavy
industrial production was necessary for the defense and survival of the Soviet system, in
the conditions of the Cold War and the arms race. With the fall of the USSR, the Kremlin
inherited an industrial complex useless for their new objectives. The Russian Army, with
its weapons demands diminishing year by year, is unable to pay its debts to the different
factories.  The arms exports,  on which high stakes  were  placed,  shrunk likewise  and
counted for not more than 3 billion USD in 1995.
13  The collapse of the military industry, the rapid transformation from a bureaucratically
centralized economy to what is  called a “free market”,  and the disintegration of  the
existing links with economic partners was catastrophic for the Russian economy. In the
last five years, the industrial production was cut by half. The dilemma for the post-Soviet
Russian leadership today is how to pull itself out of the debris, and create a new economic
sector  on  which  the  future  system  could  be  based.  With  the  appointment  of
Chernomyrdin as prime minister the bet seems to have been placed on the energy sector. 
14  The oil and gas industries were never poor in Russia, neither under the tsars, nor under
the Soviets.  Russia  has  huge reserves,  and is  the world’s  second largest  producer  of
energy5. While low-quality Russian industrial output could hardly compete with foreign
products, the oil and gas exports guaranteed the constant flow of hard currency. The oil/
gas exports, beside to the important incomes they guaranteed (around 30 billion USD in
1995), could in the future stimulate industry; idle military factories could start producing
pipes and pumps necessary for the expanding domain. Oil infrastructure needs major
renovations, and new oil projects will necessitate thousands of kilometers of pipe-lines,
plus a number of new refineries. The energy exports could therefore stimulate a revival
of the depressed Russian machine-making industry, and help convert military factories
into civilian production. 
15  The energy sector bears all the problems characteristic to the new Russia. Oil production
fell  13,5% in 1993,  12% in 1994 and 3% in 19956,  while gas output has kept its  level.
Western sources explain this downfall by the obsolete and aging infrastructure, which
needs major investments in order to prevent future decline. Russian officials say that the
fall is the natural result of the market mechanism: less demand from the industry and
consumers, therefore less supply and production. Other problems are the inability of a
part  of  these  industries  and  consumers,  and  CIS  customers,  to  pay  their  bills7.  The
infrastructure  of  oil  production,  refineries  and  the  pipe-line  networks  needs  huge
investments to modernize the aging machinery from one side, and to reshape the
industry to fit its new role of maximising exports to hard currency markets in the West8,
from the other.
16  The energy sector witnessed a fierce internal struggle over the privatization process that
started in 1994. The number of firms authorized to export oil had reached 179. A series of
assasinations of oil company  and bank directors revealed how fierce the struggle was -
and still is. Important parts of oil exports were simply diverted to private accounts in the
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West, while the distribution of gasoline and other products in Russia - as in other CIS
countries - are supervised by illegal armed groups. In spite of the continuation of both
criminal activities, and bureaucratic obstacles, there are ample signs that lead to believe
that  the  sector  has  come  out  of  its  chaotic  period,  to  an  era  of  concentration  and
consolidation9. Since the last reshaping dating from the end of 1995, three big and four
smaller (the seven sisters) oil companies have dominated the Russian energy industry. 
17  In spite of the various challenges the energy sector faces, it has proven to be the most
lucrative, dynamic and promising industry. Energy exports counted for 30 billion USD in
1995. It is also the major contributor to the federal budget, with a slice in 1996 put at 15
billion USD10. With a third of its products exported, it is a major source of hard currency.
Oil  and gas companies have formed the basis of the financial markets of the Russian
capital; for example, Gazprom and LUKoil (the largest Russian oil company) have joined
forces to create the financial giant Imperial Bank. The penetration of the energy sector
into other economic domains became visible last year. Gazprom has largely invested in
agriculture, buying kolkhozes and sovkhozes, in satellite telecommunications, apartment
buildings, etc. By the end of 1995, 205 former state farms were bought by the company,
mostly  in  southern  Russia, equal  in  size  to  the  “Tula  Province”11.  The  assets  of  the
company remains a secret, with estimates ranging from 200 billion USD up to 700 billion
or more12. To appreciate the strategic importance of Gazprom one can mention that the
company provides 30% of the natural gas of Western Europe. 
18  The energy industry occupies a place surpassing its merely economic and financial role.
Oleg Lobov, the former head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation writes that
the foreign policy of Russia pursues a strategic aim: to give back to Russia its position of
“great energetic power”13. Energy dominates the imagination of the Russian leaders in
their search for a new great power role. Asked in London in autumn 1995 what he foresaw
for Gazprom in case Yeltsin loses the presidential election, the chairman of the company
Rem Yiakhirev answered: “Anybody who comes to power is going to have to manage to
live with Gazprom because without Gazprom, they won’t manage at all”14. 
19  The position of the former energy technocrats of the head of the Russian political elite is
unchallenged. The decline of the Party apparatus was followed by the marginalisation of
the militaro-industrial complex, as shown by the failure of Arkady Volsky - its political
figure - to play an important public role15. The military institution has similarly showed
its inability to become a political factor. On the other hand, the mutations in the energy
sector  and  its  evolution  as  the  major  financial  force  have  ensured  its  political
predominance. What remains still unclear is the impact Gazprom and LUKoil will have
over the Russian economy: will they behave egoistically, defending corporate interests
only, or will they have an immaginative, global project to pull out the Russian economy
from its current crisis?
20  At a conference in Moscow in May last year, Chernomyrdin told CIS representatives that
Western companies are trying to win control of the region’s energy reserves and pose a
threat to the security of the CIS16. The Russian prime minister called for an energy
security  cooperation to  coordinate  energy production,  exports,  taxation and pipeline
construction. These declarations are in contradiction with that of the Russian Fuel and
Energy Minister  Yuri  Shafranik who told Western oil  companies  looking for  deals  in
Russia  to  stop  worrying  about  political  risk  and  get  down  to  business17.  But  the
contradiction is only in appearance: Russia wants to integrate the energy sectors of the
CIS with its own, and  cooperate with Western companies in this area. 
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21  Dominating energy distribution is a two-way profit for Moscow. States rich in energy
potential depend on Russia for their exports; those which lack energy depend also on
Russia, this time for imports. A perfect example here is the Turkmenistan gas exports to
Ukraine,  Georgia  and  Armenia.  Not  only  do  the  CIS  countries  pay  less  than  the
international prices, but in most cases they lack the cash to cover their debts, which after
long  delays  are  finally  covered  through  barter18.  While  keeping  for  itself  the  more
interesting foreign markets, Russia continues to exert influence on both ends of its pipes.
A number of CIS states have a large energy bill to Russian companies, the total surpassing
3.3  billion  USD.  Russian  officials  -  politicians  or  oil/gas  company  directors  -  have
suggested that the cumulative debt be reduced by converting it into “property rights over
installations  in  other  CIS  republics”19. The  motivation  in  Minsk  for  the  April  1996
integration treaty between Belarus and Russia was to write off its energy debts and to
receive oil and gas in the future at a reduced price. The Russian gains in the deal are less
clear apart from Boris Yeltsin’s campaign for the presidential election two months later.
Surprisingly,  Gazprom accepted the politically motivated deal  without criticism, once
again revealing the close connection between the Russian government and the semi-
private oil and gas companies20.
22  The huge deposits of oil and gas in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - it was
believed not long ago - would constitute a guarantee of an independent development of
these countries. Economic independence necessarily brings political independence and
stability.  Yet,  in  the  domain  of  energy  exports,  Russia's  southern  neighbours  seem
dependent  on its  will,  at  least  in  the  medium term.  The conclusion of  five  years  of
independence has been that oil and gas exports necessarily need Russia’s collaboration. It
is  true that most investments are from Western oil  companies,  and the exports pass
equally  through the  same companies.  By  the turn of  the  century,  specialists  tell  us,
Europe is expected to import 2 million barrels of oil daily from the Caspian region21. But
Russia still possesses the key - the pipeline infrastructure to export the oil that passes
through its territories. For landlocked Central Asia and Azerbaijan, with no access to an
open sea and their routes through Iran vetoed by a stubborn US administration that
insists on keeping the Islamic Republic out of the new Great Game, Russian routes are left
as the only choice. 
23  The Russian objectives in the energy sectors of Central Asia and the Caucasus seem to be:
24 1- to control the largest possible production shares;
25 2- total control over transport routes.
26  After much arm-twisting Kazakhstan could not but give in to Russian demands on the
pipeline question. The 27 April 1996 agreement permits Kazakhstan - and for that matter
Chevron,  the major investor in Tengiz oilfield -  to come out of  the vicious circle by
constructing a pipeline (2 billion USD is the preliminary cost) through Russia and ending
at  the Black Sea port  of  Novorossiisk22.  The pipeline company’s  main chunk went to
Russia, with a 24% state share, and another 20% for LUKoil and Rosneft, not counting
tariff  revenues  for  the  pipeline’s  Russian  operator  Transneft.  Some  Russian
commentators underlined -  not without irony -  that “the indestructible union of the
peoples of Russia and Kazakhstan ... will henceforth have a substantial economic base ...
steadily supported by a large quantity of oil”23. 
27  Kazakhstan, lacking national cohesion, cannot afford a showdown with the Kremlin. Its
president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has been carefully balancing between the state-building
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of Kazakhstan and its relations with Russia. The central authorities have cracked down on
two internal opposition movements, Kazakh nationalists and Russian groups demanding
autonomy for mainly Russian populated northern regions. The Russian “minority” counts
for 36% of the population of 17 million, and is the majority in the northern provinces. In
spite of their large numbers, the Russians are under-represented in administrative and
political  posts,  Russian-only  organizations  are  banned,  and  a  general  feeling  of
discrimination exists24. The imprisonment of Cossack Ataman Nikolai Gunkin received a
wide coverage in the Russian media, and caused the interference of the Russian foreign
ministry spokesman Grigori Karasin calling for his release. An evidence of dissatisfaction
in Kazakhstan's Russian population is the high rates of emigration; 200 000 Russians left
the country in 1993, and 300 000 in 1994. While relations are tense with his own Russian
population, Nazarbayev has balanced it with friendly relations with the Kremlin.
28  Azerbaijan  poses  the  most  serious  hindrance  to  Moscow’s  Caspian  projects.  The
September 1994 “deal of the century” did not please many Russian leaders.  Although
LUKoil  received  a  share  of  10% in  the  7.5  billion  USD project,  the  foreign  ministry
condemned it and considered it “illegal”, stressing that no deal can be finalized before an
agreement on the legal status of the Caspian is reached. Moscow pointed out that the
Caspian is a closed sea, therefore technically a lake. This means that the offshore wealth
should  be  divided  equally  among the  five  Caspian states,  and that  joint  sovereignty
should prevail,  where unilateral actions become illegal25.  Such a status would rise the
Russian portion of any deal to 20%, and give Moscow the power to veto any activity it
dislikes. 
29  While the legal aspects of the Caspian occupy specialists, Russian oil companies do not
hesitate to take part  in the major deals.  The status issue is  successfully used by the
Russian  side  to  obtain  more  important  parts  in  the  oil  fields  of  Azerbaijan  and
Kazakhstan. The October 1995 deal concerning the transport routes of the Azeri, Gunashli
and Chirag offshore fields were decided to follow two routes : one through Novorossiisk,
and the other through Poti in Georgia; yet, sources close to the consortium declared at
the time that the shipments will actually go through Russia. The Georgian pipeline would
only be used at a later stage, at the peak of production26. Yet, in that region, things can
still change...
30  In November 1995 Russia received another present from Baku. LUKoil obtained a 35%
share in a contract for the development of a new off shore oil field in the Caspian, the
Karabakh  field27.  Counting  the  joint  ventures  where  LUKoil  is  involved  (Lukagip,
Azerilukoil) its share increases to 52%28. The Azerbaijani parliament criticized the deal,
considering  that  Azerbaijan  had  surrendered  its  national  interests  to  Russia.  The
parliament chairman Rasul Kuliev said that the only benefit for Azerbaijan would be “a
limited transfer of technology”29. Azerbaijan heavily depends on the Russian economy,
and  the  closing  down  of  Russian-Azerbaijani  borders after  the  start  of  the  war  in
Chechnya  has  deeply  hurt  the  Azerbaijani  economy  and  living  standards;  in  1994
production fell by 30% and the minimum salary was equal to 1.2 USD per month30. 
31 Azerbaijani president Haydar Aliev seems to be facing an impossible mission. He wants to
mark the sovereignty of his country by refusing the creation of Russian military bases
over  Azerbaijani  territories;  to  export  oil  to  international  markets  without  Russian
meddling; and to return the breakaway region of mountaineous Karabakh to Azerbaijan, a
region which has close relations with the Russian military. 
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32  To conclude this part, Russia and the Central Asian states (including Azerbaijan) have
both common interests and deep contradictions. All of Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan rely on energy exports for their hard currency. All depend on Western
investments to keep their oil infrastructure from breaking apart, and build new pipeline
networks and refineries to accommodate current export aims. All depend on the Western
oil companies to market their products. Here, the clash of interests is clear; Russia will
permit the export of Kazakh or Azeri oil only for the price of close collaboration. For the
Russian industrial complex, the CIS countries could be a major attraction. The Russian
machine-building factories, cheaper than their Western counterparts and better adapted
to  the  economies  of  CIS  countries,  could  obtain  important  deals  for  the  oil-related
projects in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
33  The other countries which can have a direct impact on Russia’s Caspian policy  are Iran,
Turkey, the Arab states of the Middle East, and the West. 
34 If Russo-Iranian relations have taken a clear shape since the great political earthquake of
1991, Russian relations with such countries as Iraq and Syria could in the future witness
an increase in commercial exchange, military sales and political cooperation. Western
bets on Turkey to spread its “model” to the Turkic and Muslim states of the former Soviet
Union died down long ago, when they were replaced by the idea that Russian domination
over these regions is a lesser evil than the danger of “Islamic fundamentalism” that could
have spread to the new republics.  Yet,  the growing involvement of  American-led oil
companies in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with multi-billion-dollar deals, which perceive
Russia  as  an  obstacle  to  the  development  of  their  projects,  might  exert  increasing
pressure on Washington to formulate a new policy towards the Caucasus and Central Asia.
In the oil issue, the CIS countries remain a single element among many others in the
complex US-Russian relations. 
35 Iran-Russia
36  Moscow  does  not  perceive  Teheran  as  a  threat  to  its  hegemonic  position  over  its
southern, formerly Soviet, neighbours. Although the Transcaucasus was won by Tsarist
armies in the early nineteenth century in wars against the Persian empire, and Central
Asia in the distant past was a sphere of Iranian influence31 - and until today most of them
are  populated  by  Muslim  majorities  -  Iran  clearly  expressed  its  wish  to  establish
cooperation with these new independencies within limits tolerated by Moscow. Without
trying to spread its  model  of  an Islamic republic,  Iran has been carefully moving to
establish economic ties with its new northern neighbours, and through them with Russia.
37  Active interests over joint partners and common “enemies” have strengthened Moscow-
Teheran relations. Both Russia and Iran oppose the spread of Turkish influence to the
heart of Asia32. Both sides have had troubled relations with the rulers of Baku, whether
under the pro-Turkish nationalist Elchibey, or under Aliev and his manoeuvring to gain
influence through Western oil partners. Armenia and Turkmenistan serve as bridges of
cooperation between the two Caspian powers, around which they have established both
commercial  exchanges  and  strategic  bases  of  cooperation33.  Even  on  occasions  of
conflicting  interests,  like  during  the  civil  war  in  Tajikistan  where  “Islamists”  were
fighting against “Communists”, Iran prudently abstained from intervening and avoided
the anger of the Kremlin34. This, in spite of the fact that Tajiks are ethnically related and
speak a language close to Persian. Iran finds in Russia an outlet from its international
isolation, and an ally against the US. After visiting Moscow for the first time since the
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collapse of the USSR, Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati declared that “Russia
and Iran are natural allies in the face of American interference in their internal affairs”35.
This cooperation also has its “material basis”: Russian military exports to Iran counted
for 437 million USD in 1994. 
38  During five centuries Russia and Turkey fought 13 wars.  Russian mistrust of Turkey
persists, even after it became evident that Turkey was unable to extend its influence over
the  Central  Asian republics  as  Ankara  had initially  hoped.  Russia  has  been jealously
watching  any  Turkish  move  eastwards.  When  Turkish  military  and  political  leaders
announced their readiness to intervene in Nakhichevan after the Armenian successes in
the Karabakh war, then-CIS military commander Marshal Shaposhnikov warned that such
a move would lead to a “Third World War” since it would be considered a “NATO attack
on the CIS”36. Turkey is still struggling to ensure the export of a part of the Caspian oil
through a  pipeline to  be  constructed over  its  territories,  linking the Batumi  port  in
Georgia with the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. "Taking into account ecological
considerations,  oil  deliveries from Caspian deposits should be made by detouring the
Bosporus  Strait,"  said  Turkish  Foreign  Minister  Emre  Gönensay  during  a  visit  to
Washington last year37.  Ankara proposes a more expensive alternative than the Baku-
Novorossisk pipeline, that of the renovation of the Baku-Batumi, and the construction of
a new pipeline reaching the Mediterranean38. 
39  All  is  not  bleek  between Russia  and Turkey.  The  volume of  trade  has  dramatically
increased between the two countries, and Russia climbed to the sixth position for both
imports and exports in and from Turkey39.  Turkish products are abundantly found on
Russian markets, while Turkish construction firms are active in the Russian tourist cities
of Sochi and the capital. The new Gazprom office building in a southern Moscow suburb is
said to be under the supervision of a Turkish company. In return Turkey is increasingly
buying Russian weapons and energy. 
40  The old Soviet partners in the Middle East have been waiting at a distance since the fall
of the Soviet Empire. The pro-Western policy of Andrei Kozyrev, and attempts to improve
relations with Israel at the expense of its previous relations with the Arabs had deeply
angered  Damascus.  The  appointment  of  Primakov  as  Russian  foreign minister  has
“broken the ice” between Russia and Syria40. Russia has always criticized Washington's
handling  of  the  1990  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  (although Russia  has  accepted  all  UN
resolutions)  and the crisis  that  has  since continued in the Persian Gulf,  with France
actively calling for a rapid lifting of the embargo. Oil  companies and industries from
Tatarstan (a republic within the Russian Federation) are already in contact with Iraqi
authorities to start a number of projects as soon as the Washington backed UN embargo is
lifted.
41  The recent Turco-Israeli military alliance has rocked the security balance in the Middle
East.  To  counter  the  new force,  Iran  has  reinforced  its  military  alliance  with  Syria.
According to the London based Lebanese daily Al-Hayat,  an Iranian diplomat has put
forward  the  idea  of  an  alliance  between  Iran,  Iraq  and  Syria  “in  the  direction  of
coordinating tripartite policy”, and countering the Turkish and Israeli threats41. Will new
poles emerge in the Middle East, permitting Russia a more active role there? In any case,
the oil rich Arab countries, which are already in financial crisis because of the low oil
prices,  watch the  developments  of  the  oil  sector  in  and around the  Caspian closely,
worried and powerless.
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42  For the West, the potential of economic cooperation with Russia is by far greater than
that of the Caucasus and Central Asia combined. The total crude oil reserves of the former
Soviet Union is evaluated at 57 billion barrels, out of which 46.5 billion barrels are found
on Russian territories42.  To stop the decline of production, its oil industry needs huge
investments, a sum put at 50-70 billion USD. Western oil companies seem to be ready for
that,  although Russian suspicion of being “colonized” by Western investors persists43.
Russia is treating Western oil companies “one for one”: collaboration to secure Russian
interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus is rewarded with interesting contracts in oil
rich West Siberia, the North Pole region and Sakhalin island.
43  This already said, there are increasing voices in Washington demanding a more “active”
American  involvement  in  what  Russia  calls  its  “near  abroad”.  Paul  Gobel,  a  senior
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes: “Many in the United
States do not understand what is at stake. If they did and if they thought geo-politically,
they  would  realize  that  continuing  instability  or  the  restoration  of  Russian  control
throughout the region are not in our interest  or the interests of  the peoples of  this
troubled part of the world”44. Other complaints are more down to earth; “Anyone doing
business  in Russia will  testify to an unsettled legal  environment,  a  lack of  clarity in
business arrangements and the government of Russia’s willingness to direct non-Russian
firms to undertake unprofitable operations without prior consultations”45.
44  The  love-hate  relationship  between  the  American  oil  companies  and  the  Russian
authorities will continue because of the huge interests at stake: for American companies
Russia remains the best transit route to reach Central Asia; Moscow in its turn depends on
Western investments. These mutual interests will maintain Russo-American cooperation
in spite of Russian frustration at seeing Americans drilling in Kazakhstan, or US anger
about Russian manipulation to keep its dominant share of the Baku oil. 
45  If  it  was not for the eruption of violence again this August in Chechnya, the ethno-
territorial upheavals of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s would have been “history”. The
major papers today often print the map of the Caucasus and Central Asia to show the
existing pipelines, or those to be constructed, some years back the same maps of the same
regions  revealed  the  demarcations  of  the  various  ethnic  groups  and  the  linguistic
borders. But neither in Chechnya, nor in a number of other spots in the Caucasus and
Central Asia have the conflicts reached their “logical end”. The risk exists that regional
instability and great power interventions could produce new oil wars, a parallel of what
we have in the neighbouring Persian Gulf and the Arab world. 
46 Within  the  Russian  Federation,  on  the  shores  of  the  Caspian,  two  republics  exist  -
Kalmykia and Daghestan.  Chechnya,  with its  war and the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline
crossing through it, cannot be ignored. With the process of decentralisation in Russia, to
what extent can these entities play an independent role of their own?
47 Chechnya
48  The Russian military intervention in Chechnya was in our point of view, a great mistake.
And by now, it  is also a great failure.  After nearly two years,  the Russian troops are
evacuating Grozny, leaving the rule of Chechnya to Yandarbayev and Maskhadov - or the
“Dudayevist bandits” as high ranking Russian officials have called them so often. Apart
from the humiliation the Russian military  suffers  from,  the  question of  Chechnya is
uncomparably more complicated today than it was on 11 December 1994. At the time,
Chechnya was an island of exception. The idea of Caucasian rebellion had not taken form,
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since no other  North Caucasian people  joined the example  of  Chechnya to  insist  on
independence. Tatarstan - the only other example within the Russian Federation which
fought  against  Moscow  for  its  sovereignty  -  signed  an  agreement  with  the  central
authorities where it agreed to be part of Russia in exchange of economic advantages and
some additional state symbolism46. In the independent Transcaucasian republics to the
south of Chechnya, hundreds of thousands of people were moving to Russia escaping
from the wars and economic collapse. Therefore, the idea of independent Chechnya was
against the tide. Flexible Russian policy and creation of dialogue instead of demonizing
the Chechens would have succeeded with time to conclude an agreement. Martyrizing the
Chechen opposition was the only thing not to do. But, it seems the Russian generals and
politicians became the victim of their own propaganda concerning the “Chechen bandits”
or the civil war there, which was masterminded by mainly Russian agents.
49  Where do we stand now in Chechnya? How will the recent events, the Lebed-Maskhadov
agreement, influence economic developments of the Caspian?
50  The  Chechen  problem  remains  suspended,  like  the  other  conflicts  existing  in  the
Caucasus. The Russian side desperately needed a cease-fire, after the fall of Grozny. The
military initiative being on the Chechen side, they were threatening to rapidly expand
their attacks outside the boundaries of Chechnya, and one probable target seemed the
military airport of Mozdok, in North Ossetia. The Chechen war has already cost 12-15
billion USD, according to Alexander Lebed47. Yet, Russia is the loser on the ground, and it
is unclear how long the cease-fire will be respected by the Russian military. 
51  The reconquest of Grozny by the Chechen fighters introduces additional uncertainty to
the fate of the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline. Plans exist to build a new pipeline that avoids
Chechnya. Yet, the two dramatic terrorist acts undertaken by Chechen fighters outside
the boundaries of Chechnya were clear threats. Budennovsk and Kizlyar, the sights of
these attacks, are both situated on the line for the new pipeline to be constructed, that is
supposed to cross through Daghestan and Stavropol rayon instead of the Chechen region
48.  On another  hand -  the absurdity  of  this  war  -  the existing pipeline continued to
function during all the war. In fact, this pipeline was also functioning between 1991-94,
when the Russian authorities had declared a “blockade” against this rebellious republic.
Chechen oil reserves are insignificant, extinct after a century of over exploitation. The
only hope for an economic revival is the transit of the Caspian oil through the Baku-
Novorossiisk pipeline through Grozny. It is significant to remark that in spite of the war,
the Chechen groups did not attack the pipeline49. It seems that the Chechen fighters were
not only thinking about the future interests of Ichkeria50, but the pipeline continued to
supply them with much needed cash; according to the pro-Moscow administration in
Grozny, underground refineries in Chechnya profited by 33 billion rubles monthly from
oil stolen from this pipe51.
52  In  spite  of  two years  of  war  and two centuries  of  rejection of  Russian domination,
Chechnya had no other choice but to reach an agreement with Russia. It discovered that
both the international community and the Islamic world are indifferent to its fate. The
radical Caucasian People’s Confederation which wanted to create an independent North
Caucasus, has been paralyzed since the war in Chechnya started. Surrounded by Russia
and Georgia, Chechnya has no outlet to the outside world. 
53  Between  Chechnya  and  Azerbaijan,  Daghestan  remains  a  land  loyal  to  Moscow.  Its
strategic importance is great: the famous pipeline coming from Baku crosses through
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Daghestan;  Daghestan  is  the  southernmost  Russian  territory  on  the  Caspian  coast.
Regarding Daghestan’s history, this loyalty comes as a surprise. 
54  Contrary to what many observers might have expected, Daghestan has preserved its
peace, by keeping away from joining the Chechen rebellion, and by preserving its internal
peace.  All  during the first  half  of  the last  century (1805-1859) Daghestan was at  war
against Tsarist expansion to the North Caucasus. The legendary leader Imam Shamil was
himself  a  Daghestani  Avar.  That  explains  why  the  Chechens  concentrated  their
propaganda efforts on Daghestan, calling them to join their holy “ghazavat” against the
invading Russian troops. If the “country of mountains”52 had joined in the war, ethno-
territorial conflicts inside Daghestan could have erupted. The 1989 Soviet census counts
32 indigenous ethnic groups in Daghestan, the most numerous being the Avars (600 000)
down to the Ginukhs (400).  Therefore,  the leadership of  Daghestan is  conscious  that
involvement in ethnic based conflicts would bring calamity to this mosaic of peoples. 
55  Although the Daghestani leadership declared its neutrality during the war in Chechnya,
to keep the republic away from the war, still the republic suffered enormously as a result
of  the disruption of  communication routes that  linked Makhachkala with the rest  of
Russia, crossing through Grozny. The closing down of the borders with Azerbaijan and
Georgia in the south, by Russian border guards in order to prevent the flow of arms to
Chechnya,  has  further  isolated  Daghestan.  Its  self-declared  neutrality  did  not  save
Daghestan from having its border villages turned into battlefields between the federal
forces and Chechen fighters. The TV images of the hostage taking operation in Kizlyar,
and later  the violent  attack by the Russian forces  against  both the fighters  and the
hostages were spread around the globe for several days.
56  Although the war and the blockade created a feeling of unity53, a number of potential
conflicts persists in Daghestan : 
57 1-The Koumyks,  who are  the  third largest  population,  and historically  inhabited the
coastal plain around Makhachkala, are marginalized today by being a mere 22% of the
total population in their region of origin. The Koumyk national movement wants to stop
migration from the mountains to the coastal regions, and to defend the Koumyk cultural
rights. The disregard of their case by the authorities threatens to radicalize the Koumyk
movement.
58 2- The Lezgins, who live in south Daghestan and north Azerbaijan, are divided by an
international border between Russia and Azerbaijan. The Lezgin national party Sadval
demands unification of Lezgin lands within Daghestan, which is strongly opposed by Baku
54. 
59 3- The 40 000 Akins - or Chechens of Daghestan - want to return to their villages of origin
in what is now Novolakski "raïon", from where they were deported in 1944. In spite of
their solidarity with the Chechen nation during the war, the Akins did not get involved in
the war. 
60 4- The Nogays, who live in the northern part, are equally divided between Daghestan,
Chechnya, Kalmykia and the Stavropol region. 
61  Although Daghestan was not in the forefront of interest up to now, thanks to its relative
stability in a region plagued by conflicts it can play an important economic role in the
future. For example, plans exist to enlarge the port of Makhachkala. Yet, for the moment
Daghestan has a great number of problems: mass unemployment because of the closing
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down of a large number of factories in Makhachkala; rise in criminality and urban gangs;
and being encircled by rings of conflicts to its south and its west.
62  This autonomous republic with a surface of 75 900 km² is completely flat; covered by
grass in the early spring, it turns into a desert under the summer sun. Kalmykia has only
322 000 inhabitants, from which only 146 000 are ethnic Kalmyks. This Budhist people of
Mongol origin was deported to Siberia in 1943 for “collaborating” with the Nazi enemy;
during this deportation, 30% of the population perished55.  In exile,  the Kalmyks have
completely lost their language, and their traditional culture. There is no movement of
opposition against Moscow, and a visitor is left with the impression that Kalmyks are
culturally Russified.
63  The young president of Kalmykia, Kirsam Ilyumzhinov, was a successful businessman in
Moscow before returning to Elista. Through liberal tax laws and foreign contracts, he
intends  to  turn Kalmykia  into  a  business  center.  A  leader  factory  has  been recently
constructed  in  the  capital,  and  a  refinery  is  under  construction  on  the  Caspian;
enlargement of the airport and a five star hotel are among future plans56. As one of the
most stable republics in the southern part of the Russian Federation, and with a rich
businessman as president, Kalmykia is considered one of the safest places for investment
and trade activities.
64  For Russia, the Caspian basin is of great strategic importance. After an initial decline of
its influence as a result of the emergence of the newly independent states, Russia in our
point of view, succeeded to impose itself as the dominant power in the region. In the
various conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Russian military has either levers
of influence (Karabakh) or direct military presence (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Tajikistan).
Regarding the oil exports, Russia is considered now as the best route to transport both
Kazakh and the Caspian off-shore oil. If in the past Western observers thought that the
export of oil and gas would give Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the means to
exercise their independence from Moscow, in the last two years we observe that precisely
in the oil domain, these countries once again have become dependent on Russia.
65  Preserving its influence over the energy reserves of the Caspian, and its transportation,
is a necessity for Russian foreign policy. If this oil is important enough for the West to
divert its resources and decrease its dependence on the Gulf states, for the CIS states the
energy question is the primary national security problem. The independence,  foreign
orientation and reshaping of their economies depend on the energy question. Armenia,
Georgia and Ukraine are heavily dependent and endebted to the Russian energy system.
For Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the dream of a “second Kuwait” depends
on whether they will succeed in exporting their oil to the hard currency markets. For
Russia,  dominating  the  energy  of  the  Caspian  is  a  guarantee  to  preserve  its  power
position with its southern, formerly Soviet neighbours.
66  Yet,  not  everything  is  smooth.  The  failure  in  Chechnya  has  seriously  hurt  Russian
prestige  not  only  in the West,  but  also  in  the former Soviet  republics.  After  twenty
months of combat, Grozny and a section of the pipeline there are out of Russian control.
More to the south,  Azerbaijan persists  in refusing to have Russian military bases,  or
Russian-only peacekeepers in the Karabakh conflict zone. Azerbaijan is also the major
opponant to the Russian version of the legal status of the Caspian, insisting that it should
be treated as a sea and divided into exclusive economic zones. Chechnya with Azerbaijan
could form a hard nucleus to resist Russian influence there, and oppose its military and
energetic  projects.  If  Azerbaijan is  powerful  enough,  it  could insist  on the Georgian-
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Turkish  route  for  oil  exports,  and  even  constitute  a  possible  alternative  for  the
landlocked Central Asians.
67  For Russia, the oil question is not only a question of foreign policy. The energy elite today
occupies the Kremlin, and rules Russia. Its financial system depends on energy exports.
Many hope  that  the  oil  and gas  revenues  will  stimulate  the  rusty  Russian  industry.
Therefore, the future of Russia, like that of Azerbaijan or Ukraine, depends on who will
control the flow of oil and who will receive Western investments. 
68  Will the huge energy riches of Russia, plus its domination of the transport routes of the
Caspian oil, help Russia out of its crisis? Will the profits from oil and gas continue to
benefit only a chosen few? Will Moscow maintain its positions in the Caucasus after the
failure in Chechnya? The questions are both interesting and important to be followed.
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RÉSUMÉS
Après plusieurs siècles d'expansion vers le Sud et un siècle et demi de domination, la Russie
semble aujourd'hui en voie de perdre son emprise sur la Caspienne. L'émergence des républiques
indépendantes sur son flanc sud la confronte à une concurrence géopolitique sévère. L'enjeu est
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de taille car si Moscou perd le contrôle du secteur énergétique de la Caspienne, les chances de
survie de la Communauté des Etats Indépendants seront faibles. 
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